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Executive No.

65-4036/A

16 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Mr. Kirkpatrick's Memo (attached) on
Intelligence War Games

Before I show this memorandum to the Director, I would like to get your individual reactions to the proposal. I am a bit uncomfortable with the implication that the Agency can conduct such war games in vacuo. In any event, I would appreciate your advice.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

Attachment - ER-65-4036

RHelms/ecd - 16 July 65
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15 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Intelligence War Games

1. As a by-product of the planning exercise for the Agency in which I am now engaged, it becomes strikingly clear that one of the weaknesses in our present operations is a lack of intelligence war gaming.

2. As a matter of background, I would note that Recommendation No. 3 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1956 urged that there be greater participation of CIA in war gaming. Since that date CIA has participated in war games, both national and on a theater basis. These have proved to be valuable, even though unpopular.

3. In working on the long-range plan, and particularly in studying intelligence assumptions, it becomes apparent that there are many contingencies which could occur and which would necessitate rapid action on the part of CIA, including such things as redistribution of personnel, viz. the Dominican crisis. I believe the Agency would be much better prepared for these crises if it periodically engaged in intelligence war games. These could be conducted either exclusively inside CIA or by CIA in participation with the other intelligence agencies. Some of the contingencies which could be war gamed might be very remote from the point of view of possibility, but nevertheless would provide valuable experience, while others could be events which definitely will take place.

Each of these studies would revolve primarily around internal developments in a particular country, [redacted] would definitely have regional effects. Or, on a broader scale, what would be required of intelligence if Communist China sent forces into the Vietnam war? Have we given any serious consideration as to what our reaction would be should the Soviet Union seek a much closer relationship with the U.S., including possible liaison with the intelligence service and even exchange of information on Communist China?

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4. I would suggest that consideration be given to assigning to the War Plans Staff of DD/P the responsibility for sponsoring periodic war gaming of intelligence situations.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

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